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Introduction 
Simon (1962) defines a complex system as one that consists of many elements that interact in 
a non-trivial way. A strategy of a firm then is certainly complex, since it encompasses a number of 
decisions and since those decisions are interdependent. 
Complexity poses a problem of conflicting constraints in designing the optimal strategy, and 
has been in the focus of economic analysis at least for the last half a century. One of the most  
extensively studied methods of dealing with complexity, and the one that dates back to Simon’s 
work, is the decomposition of the strategy into quasi-independent modules. 
On the organizational level such decomposition would result in division of labour between 
different units and departments, while on the technological level it would mean independent design 
of the constituent parts of an artefact. 
Modularization of the problem structure has been shown to be an impressive tool for solving 
complex problems (classical text is Simon 1969, recent contributions include Frenken et al. 1999, 
Baldwin & Clark 2000, Fleming & Sorenson 2001a, Ethiraj & Levinthal 2004). However, there are 
several serious problems or dangers of modularity. 
The most obvious one is that complex structures might well just not be decomposable or even 
near-decomposable, so that the agents would be unable to divide the problem into patches or else 
find valid interfaces to start with. Any decomposition in this case would lead to neglecting some 
fraction of interconnections within the system, and depending on how important those links are, the 
efficiency achieved might be quite substantially lower than desired. 
Moreover, while it is generally true that the average solution of a more complex problem 
would be worse than that of a simpler one, it is just as true that the relation would be turned upside 
down when we look at the best possible solution of the respective problems (Fleming & Sorenson 
2001ab, 2003 provide the intuition behind this result, Evans & Steinsaltz 2002, Durrett & Limic 
2003 provide its formal proof; see also Figure 7 for simulation analysis results). 
More  complex  settings  provide  more  opportunities  in  which  elements  can  influence  each 
other, and we do need to remember that despite the fact that more attention has been given to the 
possible negative feedback loops between the elements, modularization of a landscape discards of 
just as large a fraction of possible positive feedbacks. Thus, ceteris paribus, if we want to achieve a 
higher efficiency level in absolute terms (rather than as a fraction of a globally optimal result), more 
complex landscape is simply a better place to look for it. As Fleming and Sorenson (2001b) point   2 
out: “By placing a premium predictability in their product development efforts, companies create a 
technology landscape that’s easier to navigate – but one that may produce fewer breakthroughs”
1 
Another interesting insight into dangers of a modular design has been provided by Rivkin 
(2000),  who  claims  that:  “As  the  elements  of  a  firm’s  decision  problem  grow  numerous  and 
interdependent, imitation of a successful strategy becomes very difficult.  Indeed it can become 
“intractable” in a technical sense of the word”.
2 This would suggest that strategies (or technologies) 
that are more complex are naturally codified, and hence their use hedges the firms against the risk 
of being imitated by the competitors. 
Finally, as found by Ethiraj and Levinthal (2004): “[…] in the long run, erring on the side of 
greater  integration  poses  lower  performance  penalties  than  erring  on  the  side  of  greater 
modularity”
3 This suggests that when the underlying structure of the landscape is not perfectly 
known to a decision maker, and thus the correct decomposition is not attainable, choosing a more 
complex strategy may well be a better idea than choosing a less complex one. 
Summing up all the abovementioned a conclusion can be made that while to a certain degree 
modularization is a valid strategy of dealing with complexity, it should be used with great caution. 
Moreover,  and  what  this  paper  will  deal  with,  the  “correct”  decomposition  will  still  leave  the 
resulting “blocks” rather large and the elements within them interrelated, so that alternative ways of 
dealing with complexity have to be sought. 
Modularization can be seen as an objective way to simplify the problem to be solved. The 
problem itself changes as a result, and the new problem that we obtain is objectively simpler both 
for the decision-maker herself, and for the others. Alternatively, in order to still be able to reap the 
fruits of a more complex structure and prevent the others to imitate it, a subjective way to make the 
problem  simpler  have  to  be  designed,  a  way  that  doesn’t  change  the  problem  itself,  but  our 
knowledge and abilities to solve it. 
As  a  framework  of  the  analysis  we  take  Stuart  Kauffman’s  model  of  fitness  landscapes 
(Kauffman & Levin 1987, Kauffman 1993). The original model deals with the evolution of coupled 
natural (biological) systems. It is therefore plausible to assume absence of any strategic intentions 
or foresight possessed by the agents of the system. However, this is no longer a valid assumption 
when a transition from natural to social evolution analysis is being made. 
                                                 
1 Fleming, Lee & Olav Sorenson (2001b) The Dangers of Modularity. Harvard Business Review, September, pages 
20-21 
2 Rivkin, Jan W. (2000) Imitation of Complex Strategies. Management Science, vol. 46, No. 6 (June), page 825 
3 Ethiraj, Sendil K. & Daniel Levinthal (2004) Modularity and Innovation in Complex Systems. Management Science, 
vol. 50, No. 2 (February), page 169   3 
Take a game of chess
4 as an example of a complex coupled system. Each figure on the board 
can be placed in a number of different positions, with the “value” of a given figure being in a given 
position depending on  where the  rest of the figures are placed. What the model in its original 
setting, as well as its current applications to the economics proper (see e.g. Levinthal 1997, Frenken 
et al. 1999, Kauffman et. al. 2000) assume, is that a player randomly chooses one (and only one) 
figure on the board at a time and decides whether to move it to a new position or not possessing 
perfect information of the consequences of that move for the next period, while at the same time 
being completely ignorant on how that move influences the options a player will have when she is 
called upon to make subsequent moves. 
This might be the “strategy” of someone who has never heard of the game before, but I’d be 
very skeptical to take it as a reasonable approximation for a firm’s perception of the technological 
evolution it undergoes. 
Even  quite  a  bad  chess  player  would  consider  several  possible  moves  at  a  time,  and,  a 
relatively better one would also be able to think several steps ahead when making the decision on 
the move at the current period. Indeed, this is exactly what differentiates a good from a bad player. 
The  game  of  chess  remains  the  same,  the  problem  itself  does  not  become  less  complex,  but, 
subjectively, it is simpler for a more experienced player than for the novice precisely for the reason 
that the former is more able to think in breadth and in depth. Experience of a player allows her to 
draw a better “cognitive map” of the problem.
5 
Apart from the mere reason of implausibility (after all a model is not supposed to replicate the 
real world perfectly), there are much more grounded justifications of enriching the original model in 
the proposed manner. Introducing depth and breadth of search opens up a way to consider and 
compare  the  whole  spectrum  of  local  search  strategies  from  extremely  basic  and  myopic  to 
overwhelmingly sophisticated, and measure in effect the level of sophistication needed in order to 
solve problems of different complexity. Moreover, when strategic intent enters the picture, some of 
the most important conclusions drawn from the analysis of the economic applications of the model 
in its original setting fail to hold. 
The basic insight gained from the analysis of the NK-based models of local search
6 is that for 
at  least  partially  interconnected  systems  that  are  characterized  by  the  existence  of  multiple 
                                                 
4 Think of it as a variation of a chess game played against nature, rather than an opponent 
5 See Gavetti & Levinthal 2000 and below for more detailed review of their model. 
6 The analysis is not limited to the scenario of a search being strictly local, however it has been shown that for the 
tightly coupled systems the so-called long jumps (changing the state of several elements at a time) are beneficial only 
for low initial efficiency levels. In the current paper it is therefore assumed that the firms employ only local search 
strategies.   4 
equilibria,  the  agents  are  getting  trapped  on  local  efficiency  maxima,  hardly  ever  reaching  the 
global  optimum.  Alternatively  it  is  shown  that  exhaustive  search  through  the  whole  space  of 
possible  configurations  (something  only  a  perfectly  rational  agent  can  undertake)  guarantees 
reaching  the  global  optimum,  but,  due  to  an  astronomic  number  of  such  configurations  on  a 
multidimensional  landscape, is extremely costly. 
Bringing the measures  of depth  and breadth of search into the analytical framework, the 
current paper investigates the whole space of the possible strategies of local search between the 
myopic search scenario, as in the original NK model (breadth=depth=1), and the perfect foresight 
scenario (breadth=depth=N). The main point of the current research is to show that while quite 
obviously  perfect  foresight  is  a  sufficient  condition  for  the  attainment  of  the  globally  optimal 
solution, it is by no means a necessary condition for that. 
 
2. Breadth and Depth of Search. Preliminarities 
Much of the existing applications of the NK Model of Fitness Landscapes in the fields of 
strategy  and  organizational  design  center  around  the  idea  of  decomposability  and  creation  of  
modular  quasi-independent  structures.  Despite  being  an  impressive  analytical  tool,  however, 
modularization has been shown to have certain limits. Such limits can usually be reached quite 
quickly,  leaving  the  resulting  block-structures  still  too  complex  for  a  usual  myopic  and  purely 
experiential trial and error strategy. This would lead the agents to reach solutions that while being 
possibly better than those obtainable with leaving the problem structure purely integral, are still 
inferior in most of the cases to the globally best solution existing on the landscape. 
We can see the whole problem of a decision maker as consisting of two parts: (a) finding the 
optimal level of decomposition, thus obtaining the block-structures of optimal size and complexity, 
and, (b) finding a strategy of search that given the resulting characteristics of the block-structures 
obtained, would lead us to an optimal solution of the problem. 
While much attention has been given lately to the first part of the problem, the second part of 
it is clearly underinvestigated. The task of the current paper is precisely in attempting to close that 
gap. I assume here that an optimally sized block-structures have already been obtained in the ways 
proposed e.g. by Frenken et al (1999) or Ethiraj & Levinthal (2004), and having that assumption as 
a starting point of the analysis, extend the model to find the simplest strategy that leads the agents to 
the global optimum in shortest time and with least possible requirements on the agents’ rationality 
level.   5 
2.1. Breadth of Search on Technology Landscape 
The idea of parallelism of search has been analyzed quite extensively in prior research both 
within mainstream economics (Vishwanath 1988, 1992) and in its evolutionary branch (Kauffman 
& Macready 1995). In fact, the idea has been analyzed deeper still in the field of genetic algorithm 
based evolutionary programming (Azencott 1992, Macready et al. 1996). 
Despite such a wide field of application, there is one particular nuance that at least to my 
knowledge  has  been  left  unchallenged  in  formal  modeling  exercises.  It  is  always  the  case  that 
parallelism  refers  to  the  actual  moves  made,  and  hence,  there  is  an  acquired  necessity  to  treat 
parallel search as non-local in nature. However, implicit in the models is the fact that at each step of 
the process of evolutionary search agents undergo two distinct stages: firstly they evaluate the value 
added of a possible change, and only secondly, if the analysis proves the change to be beneficial, 
they actually do move. A move here is understood to be the action of changing the state of an 
element. So by a parallel search it is usually meant that the state of more than one element is 
attempted to be changed at a single step. 
Intuitively this should lead to a faster rate of adaptation, but there is a significant problem 
embedded in such strategy. While at the stage of evaluation changes are considered one-by-one (in 
parallel  but  independently),  at  the  stage  of  the  actual  move  the  changes  are  made  together 
(simultaneously). In consequence, a situation might arise that due to internal connectivity of the 
system, while a change in any of those elements’ states leads to a higher overall efficiency given the 
other elements’ states are left unchanged, this is no longer true when those other elements’ states do 
change. Thus, the information that is used for making a decision on whether or not to flip the state 
of some particular element becomes outdated in the presence of parallel moves. 
An  alternative  way  is  proposed  here.  As  in  the  parallel  search  scenario  several  possible 
changes are considered one-by-one on the evaluation stage of the process. However, at the stage 
when the move is being made, the state of only one single element is being changed. 
So, the parallelism implicit in the evaluation stage is meant to determine in which direction it 
is more rewarding for the agent to move. The agent simply confronts the efficiency of the currently 
employed technological configuration with a set of bÎ[1;N] alternative configurations, all from its 
direct neighborhood, and chooses to move to the one that has the highest efficiency (or, if all the 
probed neighbors are less efficient than the current configuration, the agent just stays put). 
Going  back  to  the  example  of  chess,  breadth  of  search  then  is  a  measure  of  how  many 
different possibilities are analyzed before the player chooses which figure to move.   6 
2.2. Depth of Search on Technology Landscape 
While  breadth  of  search  enriches  the  structure  of  the  model  horizontally,  it  still  remains 
completely “flat”. The efficiency of the alternatives is estimated on the basis of an extremely short-
run assessment, so that while gaining in breadth, the strategy remains myopic. 
Existence of bounds on rationality and limited organizational abilities to assess far-stretching 
consequences of today’s choice is a known fact; however, going from an extreme of endowing the 
agents with perfect foresight, as commonly done in neoclassical microeconomic models, directly to 
another  extreme  of  providing  them  with  no  insight  at  all,  like  it  is  done  as  commonly  in 
evolutionary economic modeling, we actually “fly over” the most interesting cases. 
It serves then for the purposes of the current analysis to add a vertical measure of search, its 
depth. Depth of search here determines how insightful the agents conducting the search are. Just 
like in the case of breadth, we have a set DÎ[1;N]. 
The model thus recognizes the fact that the value of each alternative is comprised of (1) its 
correspondent efficiency (direct present reward of being in a given position), and (2) the options for 
further improvements that alternative creates (possible future rewards of it). The original NK Model 
was limited to evaluating alternatives solely on the basis of the former criteria. While it is possible 
to combine the two, the current paper, alternatively, is focused on strategies that are based on the 
latter criteria of assessment. 
It is important to highlight at this point that even after introduction of a vertical measure of 
search, it still remains local in nature. An agent characterized by a higher value of depth is capable 
to base its current decision on shifting to a specific technological configuration on the possibilities 
for future evolution towards higher fit such shift provides her with. This is not to say, however, that 
having spotted an attractive high-efficiency configuration, the agent is able to make a shift to it 
directly, as would have been the case for the scenario of long-jump search with foresight.
7 The 
agent would still have to change the state of one element at a time, possibly having to suffer from 
being positioned in low-efficiency points before the goal is reached. This is one of the ways in 
which more insightful search is costly. 
 
2.3. Drawing Cognitive Maps 
The idea is rather similar to the scenario proposed by  Gavetti  &  Levinthal (2000). Their 
simulation  analysis  reveals  the  interplay  between  drawing  a  cognitive  map  of  reality,  and  the 
                                                 
7 This is the scenario proposed in Gavetti & Levinthal 2000. See below for more detailed review of their model.   7 
experience bases possessed by the adapting agents. Thus, the agents are seen as both forward- and 
backward-looking. 
In their treatment of the issue, the agents are first building a partial representation of the 
landscape.  Such  representation  provides  them  with  an  opportunity  to  spot  the  globally  optimal 
configuration of some particular area of the actual landscape. 
So far the strategy is very similar to the one proposed in this paper. However, in their model, 
the agents move directly to that point in the landscape, and from there start the usual local trial-and-
error search. So after the initial insightful long jump such a strategy provides for, nothing really 
changes. If we consider the actual evolution towards better fit after step 1, the treatment is identical 
to the original NK Model with the initial point is exogenously set by the modeler. 
In the extensions of the model the authors deal with the issue of representations changing with 
time,  but  the  logic  remains:  representation  building  and  experiential  search  are  treated  rather 
separately than simultaneously. 
Spotting the  global optimum on a lower-dimensional sub-landscape in  the current model, 
instead of giving the agents the opportunity to start the local search from a “better neighborhood”, 
provides them with an insight on what direction of search might prove to be more fruitful. As noted 
above,  no  long  jumps  are  allowed  for  in  the  present  treatment,  and  thus,  having  identified  the 
current goal, the agents can make just one single local step towards it in each period. 
The other important way in which the two models differ, is that goals are reconsidered again 
and again at each step of the process. The agents here are constrained to observe the efficiencies of 
some given neighborhood around the currently used configuration only. However, at each step of 
the evolution with a positive probability the agent accepts a different technological configuration, 
and while the maximum dimension of the “observable” neighborhood stays the same, such shift in a 
position occupied by an agent would result in a different set of points on the landscape that fall into 
it. So then, for any dimensionality of the observable neighborhood, there is a positive probability 
that at any step the agent would evaluate an yet unencountered configuration with an efficiency 
level higher than that of the current goal. Whenever that happens, the goal, and in consequence the 
direction in which the search is conducted would change over and over again. 
The dimensionality of the observable neighborhood is a function of the depth and the breadth 
of search, and thus, ultimately, depending on the values of those two parameters, the agents would 
either reach the global maximum or else find themselves stuck on a sub optimal peak.   8 
3. Simulation Model. Technicalities 
3.1. Simulation Toolkit 
All  the  simulations  below  were  run  using  Laboratory  for  Simulation  Development  (Lsd) 
language,  developed  by  Marco  Valente.  Lsd  is  a  freeware  that  can  be  downloaded  from 
http://www.business.auc.dk/~mv/Lsd/lsd.html. This simulation language is built on C++ platform, 
and thus is characterized by the speed and flexibility of a low-level language. However, the layer of 
interfaces embedded in its structure make it much more user-friendly than the former, and possible 
to use by non-programmers. 
NK Model in the original setting is included in the Lsd package as one of the example models. 
The code for the modified version of it, used in the subsequent analysis in the present paper is 
available on demand from the author. 
 
3.2. Model. Formal Setting 
As in the original model by Kauffman (1987) we define the landscape with the help of the two 
main parameters: N and K. 
N measures the size of the system, or, more precisely, the number of elements it is comprised 
with. The “system” in our case is the smallest independent block structure obtained through the 
process of decomposition. K reflects the complexity of such system through measuring the level of 
interconnectedness between its elements. It is the number of other elements a change in the state of 
the  given  element  affects  (or  else  the  average  number  of  other  elements  that  affect  the  given 
element changing their state). Formally the system is represented by a binary string, so a change in 
the state of an element means a flip from “0” to “1” or vice versa. 
At the zeroth step of the simulation run all the agents are randomly placed on some point of 
the landscape from where the search is to be conducted. That starting point is defined by a random 
assignment of the binary strings. 
Each point on the landscape is characterized by some efficiency value, θ(ω) that is measured 
as an average over the efficiency contributions of the elements’ states in the system. 
Just as in the original model of random local search, at each step an agent can change the state 
of one element only. However, the judgment on whether to change or not the state of a chosen 
element is made on different grounds in this model, formalized below. 
The following table presents a summary of the key parameters used:    9 
Table 1: Summary of parameters 
Parameter  Description  Range 
N  number of elements (operations) per configuration  positive integers 
K  number of intranalities (interdependencies) per element  {0, … , N-1} 
b  number of directions sampled per step per element  {1, … , N} 
d  current depth of search  {1, …, dmax } 
dmax  current maximum depth of search  {1, … , D} 
D  maximum depth of search of the agent defined by nature  {1, … , N} 
tmax  frequency of updating of d  positive integers 
t  time steps elapsed since the last update of d  {1, …, tmax } 
Hi,ωj  set of recipes i levels away from ωj   NA 
Πωcur,ωmax  set of elements on the shortest path between ωcur & ωmax  NA 
θcur  efficiency of the currently used recipe  {0, …, 1} 
θmax  efficiency of the best recipe currently observable (ωmax)  {0, …, 1} 
ωcur  currently used recipe  2
N 
ωmax  most efficient recipe currently observable  UdÎ{1, …, dmax}  d 
 d  set of recipes sampled at the current step at depth d  see below 
 
 
The  search  strategy  algorithm  employed  by  the  agents  of  the  model  can  be  described 
technically in the following way: 
0.  Observe  the  initial  values  for  N,  K,  D,  b,  ωcur  and  tmax,  given  by  nature  (supplied  by  the 
modeler), and go to step (1) 
1.  Set initially d=1; dmax=1; t=0; θmax=0, and go to step (2) 
2.  If t=tmax, increase dmax by 1, and go to step (3) 
3.  Observe the current value of dmax 
a.  if dmax>D set dmax=1 and go to step (6) 
b.  else if dmax≤ D go to step (4) 
4.  Choose randomly b recipes from a set H1,ωcur. Denote the resulting set  1 
a.  if dmax=1 go to step (5) 
b.  else if dmax>1, for each level dÎ{2, …, dmax} and each element in  d-1 choose randomly b 
recipes from the corresponding H1,ωiÎd-1 sets of recipes, denoting the resulting set  d. Go to 
step (5)   10 
5.  Observe  and  compare the efficiencies of the resulting set UdÎ{1,  …,  dmax}  d of b+b
2…+b
dmax 
sampled recipes with the efficiency of ωcur and identify ωmax 
a.  if θcur = θmax increase t by 1, and go to step (2) 
b.  else if θcur ≠ θmax 
i)  if ωmaxÎ H1,ωcur shift to ωmax, set ωcur=ωmax, t=0, dmax=1, and go to step (2) 
ii)  else if ωmaxÏ H1,ωcur shift to ωiÎ [ 1 ∩ Πωcur,ωmax], set t=0, ωcur=ωi, dmax=1, and go 
to step (2) 
6.  Evolution stops here 
 
4. Simulation Results. Limit Cases 
4.1. Strategies of Greedy Myopic Search 
Let us first consider a set of firms that are able to evaluate many options for change at every 
point in time, but lack foresight. So then, the structure of the problem is completely flat at every 
step. In terminology of the current model this would cover the set of strategies with bÎ [1, …, N] 
and D=1. In broader terminology these strategies are variations of so-called strategies of greedy 
local search. The algorithm above is valid for the case, although much of its loops and cycles 
become redundant. 
What do we want to see at this point is whether increased breadth of search can be of any 
help even when the process lacks any depth. For that purpose we would run simulations for each of 
the combinations of bÎ [1, …, N] and KÎ [0, …, N-1]. Setting N=20 for all the simulations this 
gives us 20
2=400 combinations. To avoid having results biased due to some particular random 
event, the simulations are run for 10 different initial seeds of random numbers (thus for different 
realizations of the landscape structure), and within each seed we have 10 agents differing in staring 
point of the evolution. That gives us a total of 4.000 observations, 100 for each node in the graph.   11 
The figures below represent the results of the simulation runs. 
 
Figure 1 shows that the implied ability to conduct off-line search in several distinct directions 
in parallel improves the overall performance. However, the improvements are not very substantial: 
for no combination of b and K it is over 5% from the benchmark case, and for the main mass of the 
possible combinations it is just about 1-2%. These improvements are definitely not even close to be 
of the magnitudes needed to level off the deleterious effects on the efficiency that more complex 
landscapes bring about. This is clearly visible in Figure 2, where the average levels of terminal 
efficiency are plotted as a fraction of the global maximum. In fact, because of the changed scale, the 
high peaks clearly visible on Figure 1 are no longer obvious.   12 
 
As we can also observe from the Figure 2, for any technology with interrelated elements (any 
technological landscape with K¹0), breadth alone, no matter small or large does not guarantee the 
firms employing the strategy to achieve the globally optimal efficiency other than by chance. 
Another  interesting  result  is  presented  in  Figure  3.  Here  we  can  see  that  while  the 
improvements over the benchmark case are positively correlated with an increase in b as an average 
over  all  K,  increasing  K  contributes  to  improvements  in  the  efficiency  up  to  some  point  only, 
making an overall effect of increasing both b and K ambiguous. Indeed, the highest improvements 
are achieved for large b and average values of K.   13 
 
Increased breadth of search has a double effect. From the one hand it has a positive effect in 
what rather than just sampling a single adjacent technology at a time and making a decision on 
whether to accept or reject the shift, the firms in this setting are able to view several options for 
change, and choose the best one. 
However, on the other hand, the more greedy the search process becomes, the more crucial 
difference does the assumption of it being completely myopic makes, so, the more is the probability 
that a firm would end up on a local peak after a very short time. Indeed, as the Figure 4 shows 
search time is a strictly decreasing function of both b and K.   14 
 
This means, however, that strategies with higher breadth are faster on average, and thus, for a 
market populated by firms differing only in this characteristic, this would be a clear-cut advantage if 
competition enters the general picture. 
 
4.2. Strategies of Search with Narrow Insight 
Let us now go to the other extreme, and consider the limit case when the insight into the 
future  that  the  firms  possess  is  a  tunable  parameter,  while  only  one  direction  for  change  is 
investigated at each time step. So, while the firms are not myopic anymore, their search instead is 
set to be extremely narrow. 
The intuition behind such set of the strategies is that while being rigid in defining a strategy, 
the firms nevertheless are able to think the strategy through for more than one step ahead. So the 
firm designs a long-term plan at each given step, analyzing whether the direction of change chosen 
would be fruitful for the future growth, but, is flexible enough to reconsider the exact direction of 
change in the next period, if the new information that became available calls for such action. If that 
happens a new long-term plan is designed, and is accepted as a guideline for future change unless at 
any future period an alternative is found that has a higher maximum payoff in the future.   15 
Technically, similarly to the previously analyzed limit case of greedy myopic search, it would 
mean that this would cover the set of strategies with DÎ [1, …, N] and b=1 on the set of the 
landscapes with varying complexity, so that KÎ [0, …, N-1]. 
All the rest of the settings are left like before, so once again that gives us a total of 4.000 
observations, 100 for each node in the graphs below. While the setting remains almost unchanged, 
the results we obtain from running the simulations differ quite substantially. 
 
Figure  5  (compare  with  Figure  1)  shows  us  the  magnitude  of  improvements  over  the 
benchmark case that such strategies bring about. The results are much more impressive than in the 
previous setting, with the improvements of about 15% not being stand outs, and an average (over all 
combinations of D>1 and K>0) of about 7% observed. 
This is being further confirmed by the results summarized in Figure 6 (compare with Figure 
2) where the average levels of terminal efficiency are plotted as a fraction of the global maximum. 
Here, we see that while the improvements are still not enough to cover the gap with the global 
maximum, the firms are getting much closer to it even for very complex landscapes.   16 
 
However, as it had been hinted above in the discussion on dangers of modularity, in absolute 
terms the  average efficiency of the  global maximum on the technology landscape is positively 
correlated with the complexity of the latter. 
 This is obvious from the Figure 7 where the average results over 400 (20 for each value of K) 
landscapes are presented. This means that the results reported as a fraction of the corresponding 
global  maximum  are  biased  towards  lower  levels  of  complexity.  If  we  adjust  the  results 
accordingly, we observe in Figure 8 that when applying a strategy that is not myopic, the firms 
would quite often prefer using more complex and interconnected technologies rather than modular 
ones. As the graph shows this is actually true even for the benchmark case. Despite the fact that the 
global maximum is obtained only for K=0 landscapes, in the absolute terms the highest efficiency is 
reached when K is as high as 5.   17 
 
 
However, not all is as bright as it seems. While clearly having a significant positive impact on 
the terminal efficiency of the technological configuration, a strategy with insight take longer to 
actually get us there. Such strategies lead to an increase in checking and double checking whether 
the technological configuration attained is indeed the best of what’s around, and, given the structure   18 
of the algorithm, the agents would leave a relatively high local peak even if they spotted another 
one only marginally better, no matter how far that new target is. All this leads to increased search 
times, and thus, higher costs and the danger of being outcompeted by less “insightful” but faster to 
adapt rivals. 
 
5. Simulation Results. General Case 
5.1. Striving for the Global Optimum 
What  we  have  seen  until  now  is  that  both  breadth  and  depth  of  search  taken  separately 
improve the terminal efficiency of the technology used by the firms, albeit to a different extent and 
with  differing  side  effects.  It  has  also  been  shown  that  while  in  relative  terms,  measured  as  a 
fraction of the global optimum, the improvements in the efficiency level due to an increase in either 
depth or breadth of search taken separately do not manage to outshadow the negative effects of 
growing  complexity,  in  absolute  terms,  the  levels  of  efficiency  achieved,  with  an  increase  in 
complexity first grow and then only start to fall. These results already cast some doubt on whether 
an extreme modularization of the landscape as proposed in the related literature is indeed justified. 
However, to make the picture complete we would try here to answer whether there is any 
combination of b and D other than that corresponding to the strategy with perfect foresight that 
leads even the firms adapting on quite complex technology landscapes to the global maximum. 
For that purpose we would leave the limit cases, and consider the whole family of strategies 
with both bÎ [1, …, N] and DÎ [1, …, N]. For brevity, we would not however consider all the 
possible combinations of b, D and K, running the simulations for K=1, K=4 and K=11. 
The results summarized in the Figures 9, 10 and 11 speak for themselves: not only perfect 
foresight is not a necessary condition for reaching the global maximum, but in fact there is a very 
large set of less “perfect” alternative strategies that do just as good.   19 
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It comes as no surprise that for more complex landscapes reaching the global peak requires 
more  sophisticated  strategy.  More  interesting  is  the  observation  we  can  make  that  perfect 
knowledge of the underlying structure of the connections between different elements or operations   22 
comprising the technology set is not a necessary condition even where such connections create a 
tremendously perplex web. 
5.2. Actual vs. Maximum Depth 
Do we require too much rationality from the agents? Is it true that having even a modest D 
would be too much to ask for? The answer is probably negative. 
Non-stringency of the strategy sophistication is reinforced fist of all by an observation we can 
make with the help of a more thorough analysis of the results obtained. Recall from the setup of the 
search algorithm above that D is the maximum depth of search of the agent defined by nature rather 
than the depth of search used at each step of the evolutionary process. Indeed if we observe the 
actual depth used throughout the evolution towards the ultimate sticking point, its average value 
even for the firms endowed by the modeler with high levels of D is much lower on average. For the 
large  part  of  the  life-cycle  the  firms  still  use  the  low-cost  myopic  reasoning  that  suffices  for 
dismissing  clearly  inferior  directions  of  search,  while  going  deep  into  analyzing  only  several 
promising ones. Indeed the value of d (see Table 1 for definition) is being increased only when its 
current value is not enough to justify the dismissal of a particular direction; it is only in this case 
that a firm endowed with D>1 uses the insight, and even then, the increase in d is gradual, rather 
than abrupt, and as soon as its level is sufficient to spot an alternative direction leading to a more 
efficient technological configuration starts the new cycle of evaluation process from d=1. 
To show this we ran simulations for the landscape with N=20, K=10, DÎ [1, …, N], and bÎ 
[1, …, 6] and take the average over the actual depth d for each class of agents. As the results in 
Figure 12 show, only for the case of b=1 and high values of D do we observe average actual values 
of d higher than 2, and even in this case the highest value observed is just over 3 for the case when 
D was set to 20.   23 
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Another important thing that this figure tells us is that d grows with the growth of D only for 
the classes of agents whose breadth and depth of search are not sufficient to guarantee reaching the 
global optimum in all instances. When for a given b, the value of D exceeds that threshold, the 
further increase of the latter does influence the average value of d. This leads us to suggest that for a 
given b all the strategies with the value of D higher than the lowest needed to guarantee 100% of 
the agents to find themselves at the global peak, are almost identical. All of them spot the global 
maximum at exactly the same time, and reach it after exactly the same number of steps, the only 
difference being that more “insightful” agents take more time to double check the fact that this 
indeed is the global maximum, putting it through a test of confronting to a larger number of points 
on the landscape. Before reaching the global maximum such strategies are identical in all respects. 
Indeed, the only reason the lines on the graph are not completely flat after some point lies in 
stochastisity of the landscape structure. 
 
5.3. Further Arguments on Non-Stringency of Rationality Assumptions 
Another important characteristic implicit in the current design of the search algorithm is that 
the search is redundant, in the sense that the firm can encounter exactly the same configuration of 
the technology over and over again. This is due to two main factors: 
(1)  given  the  definition  of  the  technological  distance  of  any  two  recipes  as  being 
symmetric, if we made a local move from technology 1 to technology 2 at a given step, the 
former becomes a part of the adjacent technologies set for the latter, and given the random 
nature of choosing the b alternative elements with which the firm can experiment at each 
step, with a positive probability, increasing with an increase in the value of b, it well might 
also become a part of the set  1 as defined above. 
(2)  given the definition of the technology landscape as a graph, each two technological 
configurations can be converted into each other in a huge number of ways different in 
length.  The  shortest  way  to  reach  technology  2  from  the  technology  1  is  termed  the 
Hamming distance between the technologies. However, a variety of other, longer ways to 
do exactly the same exist, which leads to further redundancy of the search process. 
Thus, the actual number of new technological configurations sampled at each step is much 
lower than the equation in the search algorithm would suggest, implying in sequence that just as in 
the case with high values of D, high values of b do not necessarily depict overly-sophisticated 
nature of the strategy in use.   25 
Another way in which the strategies are clearly boundedly rational is that nothing prevents a 
firm to lose the track of the exact path that leads it to the targeted high-efficiency technological 
configuration.  While  its  efficiency  would  become  in  a  way  the  aspiration  level  that  the  other 
sampled technological opportunities would be compared with, the actual direction the target lies in 
can become blurred by the random choice of the directions for change in the next period. 
Finally, we can also observe from the graphs that even when the strategy does not suffice for 
attainment of the globally optimal technological configuration for all the studied realizations of the 
landscape structure and all the sampled starting points of the evolutionary process, it usually does so 
in most of the cases, leading to average results just 1-2% lower than the global maximum. This 
would let us suggest that in a world where the e-satisficing solutions
8 (even if only the ones with e 
very small) are acceptable alternatives to the globally optimal result, the requirements necessary to 
impose on the level of sophistication of the strategy in use are far from being stringent. 
 
6. Enter the Competition 
In such an abundance of strategies leading to the globally efficient solution or to a one just 
marginally inferior to it, we have to specify which combination of b and D we would actually want 
to choose. We have concluded so far that up to some limit the more insight is used in the search 
process, the more likely it is to end up at the global maximum. However, as we have also seen, after 
the minimal level of D sufficient for the attainment of the global maximum for all the agents in the 
class is reached, the further increase in D no longer has a positive effect. 
Costs per se do not enter the analysis in this paper explicitly. Nevertheless, the costliness of 
search  here  can  be  implicitly  measured  by  the  average  efficiency  of  the  technologies  used 
throughout the evolution towards the peak, as well as the length of time it takes the firms to get 
there. 
Simulations ran and discussed above lead to suggest that search time is an increasing function 
of D, and decreasing function of b. So, if we necessarily want to secure the global efficiency for all 
the agents, and have no budget constraints, an obvious choice of the strategy would be to maximize 
b, and use the smallest DÎD(b)
max, where D(b)
max is the set of depth values that lead to the global 
maximum for a given b. 
                                                 
8 Defined by Frenken et al. (1998) in the following way: “The set of e-satisficing solutions is the set of strings whose 
value is at most e lower than the global optimum”, page 157   26 
However, from the one hand, the breadth of search is costly, and thus, we should be more 
interested in modest values of b, and from the other, as was noted above, there exist a whole set of 
strategies that although do not belong to  D(b)
max set, allow a large fraction of the agents in the 
respective classes to reach the global maximum, or else to come very close to it, while, at the same 
time economizing on search time. Moreover, this set of e-satisficing strategies that we can term 
D(b)
sat have another important advantage. Due to a lower D the agents suffer less from the low-
efficiency  intermediate  positions.  This  effect  was  not  pronounced  in  our  simulations,  since  the 
terminal efficiency only was measured, and it was not of importance how well do the agents do a 
the intermediate steps of the simulation run. 
In the real world, however, not only the final result matters, but also, the intermediate ones. 
To be able to study this factor, I introduce competition between the agents. The simulation proceeds 
as follows. At its start we have two classes, each containing 50 agents and they run on a landscape 
with  N=20,  K=10.  For  each  pair  of  competitors  simulations  were  repeated  for  20  times.  With 
frequency F, a certain number S of worst-performing agents are being replaced by the copies of the 
agents that perform the best. With probability Prand the agents copy just the strategy of their parents, 
while with probability 1-Prand they copy as well the position of their parents on the landscape. 
 We set the breadth of search, b=3. The classes differ in the value of D. One of the classes is 
characterized by a lowest value of DÎD(3)
max which is D=11 and thus is the quickest strategy of the 
D(3)
max set. The other class, alternatively is populated by agents using e-satisficing strategies. First 
we ran simulations for agents with D=8 against the ones with D=11. The controls were: 
·  Speed of competitive pressure F=[10, 25, 50, 100, 250] steps 
·  Strength of competitive pressure S=[1, 2, 5, 10] agents 
·  Probability of random relocation Prand=[0,
1/2,1] 
Changing those three controls didn’t alter the results in any significant manner, for which 
reason the rest of simulation runs were performed for F=50, S=2 and Prand =
1/2.   27 
We ran simulations to compare all the one-to-one combinations of DÎ[2; 3; 5; 8; 11]. The 
simulation run would stop either if one of the classes achieved 100% of the market share, or if all 
the agents in both classes reached the global maximum, or if neither happened for more than 10000 
steps. The table below summarizes the results: 
Table 2: Market Share (Fraction of Agents Belonging to the Class) at the End of the Simulation Run  
  D=2  D=3  D=5  D=8  D=11 
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As the results show, we observe that both D=5 and D=8 agents outcompete more insightful 
D=11 ones, leaving them just a little more than a third of the market share. This means that the 
value added of the increased insight after some point is out shadowed  by the slower speed of 
adaptation and low intermediate efficiency levels. 
D=5 agents perform marginally better than D=8 ones against more insightful agents, while 
in direct competition they each get about 50% of the share. D=2 and D=3 agents lose against 
higher-depth agents, but even they find a small market share when competing against D=11 agents, 
while losing it all for the e-satisficing D=5 and D=8 ones. The reason for a positive market share 
values for D=2 and D=3 is to a large degree explained again by the slower adaptation speed of 
D=11 agents. Running simulation for longer than 10000 periods let the latter get the 100% market 
share in most of the cases, especially so for the case of competition with D=2 agents. 
 
Conclusions and Further Research Agenda 
Trying to build a theory or a model in one scientific field using the framework adapted from 
another is a challenging and a very dangerous venture. Both evolutionary economics, and even if 
we  consider  it  as  such  to  a  lesser  extent,  the  mainstream  neoclassical  economics  are  firmly   28 
grounded  in  evolutionary  biology  and  classical  physics  respectively.  However,  what  works  for 
biological and physical systems, might well not be appropriate for the social domain, and even if it 
is, major changes have to be made in order to fine tune the borrowed insights into the new field of 
application. 
Although being itself designed as a contribution to the evolutionary thinking in economics, 
this  paper  is  critical  to  both  the  competing  fields.  Concentrating  on  the  behavioral  part  of  the 
discourse, the starting point of the analysis has been made with the claim that evolutionary and 
neoclassical economic theories find themselves in the opposite extremes as far as the ability to 
foresee and the intentionality of the actions by economic agents are treated. Both extremes can 
sometimes be valid simplifications, but, too often indeed, they lead to very local results. 
Behavioral  assumptions  of  the  neoclassical  theory  have  been  challenged  from  within  the 
evolutionary stream on many occasions and although the analysis in this paper is meant to shed 
some more light on that issue, the main motivation behind is to analyze whether the assumption of 
very limited myopic foresight of the agents in the evolutionary economics itself does indeed have to 
be revised. 
The paper addresses primarily the recent and fast growing stream of evolutionary modeling 
exercises  based  on  Kauffman’s  NK  Model,  initially  designed  to  study  genetic  evolution  in 
microbiology. The previous applications of the model to economics proper have addressed a variety 
of topics in organizational and technological change, and have provided a number of extremely 
interesting results and insights. 
One particular issue that attracted a substantial part of the research efforts in the field is the 
idea of connecting the model with Herbert Simon’s insight on decomposition of complex systems. 
Indeed, with the rise in complexity of the problem stemming from the increase in the level of 
interconnectedness of the elements it is composed of, it becomes more and more difficult to find an 
efficient solution to it through local random search of the alternatives. 
A way to tackle the issue proposed was to try to break the big problem into a number of 
independent or almost independent patches that can be solved separately without affecting each 
other in any significant way. This way of decomposing complex landscapes into more modular ones 
has been shown to be an effective strategy for success. 
Modularity however has its own substantial drawbacks. While making it easier to find the 
global optimum on that simplified landscape, discarding from the negative externalities present on 
more complex landscape, modularization discards just as well of the possible positive externalities. 
As  Fleming  and  Sorenson  (2001)  note:  “Although  the  average  peak  height  declines  as   29 
interdependence rises, some of the ‘good’ positions on the high-K landscape dominate the best 
points on the low-K landscape.”
9 
The problem with decomposition strategies is that they are aimed to find an objective way to 
make the landscape less complex, or, in other words, instead of trying to learn how to solve a more 
complex problem, the agents in that setting simply substitute that problem with a less complex one. 
However, taking technology as an example of a complex system, we might notice that apart from 
the  problem  addressed  in  the  previous  paragraph,  decomposing  the  system  (1)  can  be  simply 
impossible to do, because of the difficulties of truncating the technology in question, and (2) makes 
the technology more imitable, thus increasing the dangers posed by the competitors (Rivkin 2000). 
It was argued above that noticing that complexity is partly a subjective matter, an alternative 
way to cope with the issue can be proposed, and namely, that of trying to endogenize some part of 
the connections by learning their effects. 
It has been claimed here that the treatment of the agents in the group of models as being able 
to evaluate only a single alternative at a time step, and then only to see just the immediate direct 
effects  of  a  possible  shift  to  it,  while  valid  in  the  original  biological  domain  of  the  model,  is 
extremely  unrealistic  when  we  shift  our  attention  to  the  issue  of  how  firms  develop  their 
technologies. 
So then, by introducing the notions of breadth and depth of search on a technology landscape, 
the current model has dealt with the ways to simplify the complex landscapes subjectively through 
learning of their underlying structure by sampling in several directions in parallel and giving a 
weight to longer-term effects a shift to an alternative technology can have. 
It has been shown through simulation analysis that while breadth and depth of search taken 
separately contribute to an increase in the efficiency of the terminal “sticking point” technology, it 
is only with both factors present when the agents acquire the ability to effectively find the global 
optimum even on a very rugged landscape. 
The costs of increasing the “observable” region of the overall landscape have not at this stage 
been modeled explicitly. However, it has been shown that through increasing the probability of 
getting stuck on a sub-optimal peak too early (breadth), and increasing the length of time required 
to find a sticking point, thus exposing themselves more to the dangers of competitive pressure 
(depth), such costs entered the picture implicitly. 
                                                 
9 Fleming, Lee & Olav Sorenson (2001) Technology as a Complex Adaptive System: Evidence from Patent Data. 
Research Policy 30, page 1022   30 
Introducing the competitive pressure was the most direct way to extend the model, and the  
results shown that less “insightful” firms quite often outcompete the more “insightful” ones, but the 
myopic firms of the benchmark model still die out first. 
There are several other ways in our research agenda in which the model can be modified. 
From the one hand, lifting the assumptions of extreme redundancy of search and inability to keep 
the track of the direction in which the current goal lies, would reinforce the results of the current 
model,  letting  firms  possessing  even  lower  levels  of  b  and  D  to  effectively  reach  the  globally 
optimal configuration. From the other hand however, lifting the quite strong assumption of the 
agents being able to estimate the efficiency of the technologies that are within their “eyesight” 
precisely, no matter how distant they are, should work in the opposite direction
10. 
Moreover, several different ways of evaluating the fruitfulness of some particular direction of 
change might be interesting to explore, including basing the decision on the average (or weighted 
average) efficiency over the resulted path of change, or a minimax criteria to deal with risk-averse 
decision makers. 
                                                 
10  even  if  such  noisy  evaluation  in  the  myopic  case  has  proven  to  be  efficiency-enhancing  to  some  extent  (see 
Hovhannisian 2003abc)   31 
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